

SECRET

29 July 1946

TO: AB-43, Munich
FROM: AB-51, Amson
SUBJECT: GULL's Operational Possibilities
REF: RIR 238

1) Re above report, we wish to reserve our opinion on the advisability of exploiting GULL's operational possibility as listed under A (Penetration of the work of the II Bureau). In the last analysis this would be a double agent operation directed against the French Intelligence Service which is not one of our targets let alone a priority target. There must be more direct and more productive pipelines into the II Ieme Bureau. In this connection we strongly advise against handing GULL deception material on Soviet OB to be given to the II Ieme Bureau. The collection of intelligence on Soviet OB is a legitimate function of the II Ieme Bureau, directed exclusively against Soviet Russia. Although we do not approve of French intelligence poaching on our preserves, such activities, if proven, can be curbed more effectively by a direct demarche. Assuming that the French allow us access to their OB material on General Staff level, we would, by placing deception material into II Ieme Bureau channels, run the risk of feeding it to our own Army G-2. As regards the French KRI's listed in your report, all this information they could probably get for the asking, given the proper safeguards against its falling into the wrong hands.

2) The penetration of Soviet I.S. activities in the French Zone is a worthwhile operation as long as it does not lead us astray into a double agent operation against French intelligence. In other words, if GULL, through his manifold contacts with French intelligence officers, can gather information pertinent to Soviet penetration attempts, he should be encouraged to do so.

3) We fully approve of the projected use of GULL as a penetration agent into the NISMP and in particular

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the "Most Secret Council" (a designation vaguely reminiscent of a very popular soap box opera). Here again, we should beware of identifying ourselves too closely with the political objectives of that organization (leaving, of course, a margin for operational lip service). The extensive use made of cut-outs in the conduct of your operations (which, by the way, has drawn the praise of the Chief of Mission) should obviate any danger of that kind. We are definitely interested in the BRYANSK forest operation but would like to see some tangible evidence that it amounts to more than "pin-pricking the bear". Is the SHULGIN of the "Most Secret Council" identical with Tamara SHULGIN (RIR 107)? If he is the king-pin of the whole enterprise, we should start probing into his past as soon as possible.

4) We should like you to give some thought to what effective steps could be taken to pry GULL loose from the French Intelligence Service without harming his usefulness to us. If the BRYANSK forest operation should hold what it promises, it would be quite untenable from the point of view of security if we were to continue condoning GULL's relationship to the French Service. It might be a good idea to get square with GULL now, before we invest too heavily in him.

5) It may interest you that a consolidated report on Soviet Intelligence activities in the French Zone, based exclusively on your material, is in preparation here.

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